Un’opinione giuridica eretica su Trump

Un’opinione giuridica eretica su Trump:
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Il Tema….scienze sociali e filosofia

Il presente blog si occupa di filosofia del dirittofilosofia  generale e politologia, come campi preferenziali per ipotesi di lavoro e connessioni tematiche interdisciplinari sul tema della mediazione sociale.

Questi campi, infatti, possono essere integrati per chiarire il concetto di “mediazione” nel e del conflitto sociale, cioè della mediazione intesa come attività logica, dialettica e pratica del fornire una soluzione pacifica alle controversie degli attori sociali, in condizioni di alternativa alla divisione talvolta dicotomica, e tipica del diritto, tra parti vincenti e soccombenti del conflitto. Pur senza rinunciare all’applicazione di norme giuridiche, ma ampliandone anzi il campo di applicazione o superandolo.

Naturalmente per “mediazione” si può intendere non solo la negoziazione pacifica dei conflitti, ma anche in generale l’atto individuale, di ogni attore sociale, dell’apprendere, sperimentare ed applicare le prassi sociali, della vita civile quotidiana, rivolgendole alla promozione di una convivenza  benevola nei riguardi di altri e di noi stessi.

L’attività della mediazione è per la prima volta testimoniata dalla storia dell’antica Grecia, che conosceva la figura, in realtà in senso spregiativo, del mediatore di relazioni non-coniugali come “proxeneta” (dal gr. προξενητής, der. di προξενέω «ospitare, procurare», e questo da πρόξενος: v. prosseno), poi passata nella civiltà romana in diversa accezione. La legge romana, infatti, a partire dal Digesto di Giustiniano del 530-533 D.C. ha riconosciuto la mediazione come ruolo sociale di intercessore, filantropo, interlocutore, conciliatore, interprete e infine “intermediario”.

Queste prassi (filantropia, intercessione, conciliazione, ecc.) sono oggetto, in realtà, non del tutto estraneo al normale training dell’educazione civile moderna (o post-moderna), e conoscerle, verificarne l’uso ed impiegarle in senso tecnico, è esperienza di cui è meno facile parlare di quanto sia invece comune esperirne la quotidianeità. Vi è sempre un mediatore “imparziale” che lega gli individui alla società in cui vivono: si tratti delle formazioni sociologiche primarie come la famiglia oppure di quelle secondarie come la scuola e lo stato. Inoltre, anche l’economia e la filosofia dell’economia hanno da tempo (A. Smith,Teoria dei sentimenti morali) riconosciuto la presenza in ciascun individuo di un naturale “intermediario”, uno spettatore imparziale che induce ciascuno di  noi a giudicare noi stessi come fossimo “solo una delle parti in causa”. Secondo Adam Smith il giudice interno, lo «spettatore imparziale», interviene a censurare i “nostri” comportamenti che ledono le regole fondamentali del vivere civile, procurando vergogna e rimorso, frenando gli uomini dall’agire esclusivamente in vista dell’interesse personale, quando è in gioco la felicità altrui. Smith usava la nota metafora di Cicerone, ripresa a sua volta dallo stoico Crisippo, per cui nella gara per procurarsi i beni ciascuno ha il diritto di usare tutte le forze di cui dispone per raggiungere i suoi obiettivi, senza tuttavia commettere ingiustizia e sgambettare i rivali durante la corsa.

E’, quindi, sempre in atto, per ognuno di noi, una più o meno conscia attività di “mediazione” tra la nostra realtà di individui o di “gruppi” e la particolare “logica della situazione” della realtà allargata del mondo, cui siamo vincolati ogni giorno e che, ogni nuovo giorno, si presenta con caratteri costantemente rinnovati.

 

SVILUPPO DELLA MEDIAZIONE NEL DIRITTO E NEL COMMERCIO

In tempi recenti, la più consistente applicazione “tecnica” della mediazione propriamente intesa è avvenuta in campo giuridico, in Australia.
Il concetto di ADR, “Alternative Dispute Resolution“, una risoluzione alternativa (al diritto) delle controversie, è iniziata nelle relazioni industriali in Australia molto prima dell’arrivo dell’attuale movimento globale dell’ADR. Le procedure avviate riguardavano il diritto del lavoro e le relazioni sindacali tra datori di lavoro e organizzazioni di lavoratori.

Uno dei primi statuti approvati dal parlamento del Commonwealth fu la legge sulla conciliazione e l’arbitrato del 1904, che permise al governo federale australiano di approvare leggi per la risoluzione pacifica di controversie industriali, che avessero anche geograficamente un’estensione superiore ai limiti di giurisdizione dei singoli stati australiani.

Questo tipo di conciliazione era ancora molto lontana dalla mediazione moderna, ma ha costituito la testa di ponte verso i moderni istituti giuridici e commerciali. Lo sviluppo senza precedenti dell’attuale prassi degli ADR (arbitrati, mediazione civile e conciliazione) nelle “dispute commerciali” è debitore di questo primo inizio in Australia.

 

MEDIAZIONE, DIRITTO E STATO (O IL MONOPOLIO DELLA FORZA IN SOCIOLOGIA)

La trasformazione del conflitto in soluzione pacifica deriva, secondo alcuni modelli sociologici (J. Galtung e F. Gasl) dalla riduzione dei gradi di “escalation”, che è il processo inverso dell’aumento del grado di intensità e di violenza del conflitto. L’escalation è caratterizzata dal superamento di determinate soglie che ne scandiscono in maniera chiara le diverse fasi. I modelli di escalation possono essere assai complessi (è il caso ad es. del modello proposto da Gasl nel 1997).

Grosso modo è possibile distinguere tre grandi fasi in un processo di escalation (Arielli/Scotto 2003, p. 68 ss.):

  • quando il conflitto è a un basso livello di intensità prevale la dimensione della contraddizione di fondo: le parti sono convinte che è possibile trovare una soluzione negoziata con l’accordo di tutti. A causa della crescente frustrazione, una o più parti saranno tentate di adottare la tattica del fatto compiuto (imporre uno stato di fatto sociale come soluzione del conflitto);
  • in un momento intermedio dell’escalation, le parti hanno perso la fiducia nella possibilità del dialogo e rafforzano la percezione del carattere negativo dell’altro, della necessità di una contrapposizione, fino ad arrivare ad adottare la strategia della minaccia e dell’ultimatum (lo stato di fatto delle conformazioni sociali attuali non è più sufficiente e va cambiato);
  • a livello più elevato di escalation sono i comportamenti delle parti ad essere in primo piano, ed in particolare l’uso della coercizione e della violenza (la violenza instaura un nuovo stato di fatto).

Come il conflitto, anche la ricerca di strumenti di gestione è un’esperienza universale: Ogni società si dà proprie regole (p.e. sistemi giuridici e tribunali) per far sì che le forze distruttive del conflitto non compromettano la tenuta della vita associata.

In risposta ai conflitti interni sono possibili meccanismi di gestione non coercitiva del conflitto (come la negoziazione e la mediazione, e di gestione delegata a un terzo, come l’arbitrato o le procedure giudiziarie), solo quando il diritto è ancora considerato un mezzo disponibile, per quanto sofisticato per gestire i conflitti all’interno delle società, quando, cioè, la forza militare o di altro tipo è ancora monopolizzata da “un’autorità superiore” (p.e. Stato).  Infatti, la mancanza di forti legami associativi e l’assenza di un monopolio legittimo dell’uso della forza fa sì che, p.e. a livello internazionale, i conflitti degenerino facilmente in forme sempre più violente fino anche alla guerra.

E’, invece, principalmente all’interno di uno “Stato” che monopolizza la forza che sono possibili le alternative alla violenza del diritto, innanzitutto, e della “negoziazione”, dopo (che è strumento complementare del “diritto”). La mediazione, il problem solving e la diplomazia multilivello (multitrack diplomacy) sono, anzi, strumenti ancora più fini del diritto dal punto di vista delle “soluzioni finali”, pur avendo bisogno della protezione esterna del diritto e dello stato, per attuare una trasformazione, in senso costruttivo, dei conflitti a carattere etno-politico.

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La sociologia sarà quindi la disciplina maggiormente chiamata ad tessere la trama del presente blog. Perchè mediare la soluzione di un problema sociale è, infatti, tema sociologico e sufficiente per supportare un blog della connessioni tematiche interdisciplinari tra filosofia del diritto, della filosofia  generale e della politologia.

La cronaca giornalistica e la narrativa  faranno da banco di verifica e controllo (di falsificazione) delle teorie via via proposte dal presente Blog.

La teoria delle reti sociali, combinata con la matematica fuzzy, nel nuovo aggregato teorico dei “fuzzy graphs sociali” sarà il possibile strumento di formalizzazione delle proposte teoriche degli autori.

 

RETI SOCIALI, MATEMATICA DEI FUZZY GRAPHS, EMPATIA

Il concetto di “fuzzy graph” descrive una rete sociale i cui nodi e i cui legami siano aperti e presentino confini vaghi e fluttuanti.

Si può spiegare la definizione di fuzzy graph, ricorrendo ai seguenti passaggi dimostrativi e metaforici:

  • Il concetto di rete sociale deriva in modo naturale e intuitivo dal concetto della rete di un pescatore, i cui nodi e fili siano sostituibili in modo astratto dai nodi-vertici delle persone (gli attori sociali) e i fili dalle relazioni sociali e umane.
  • Il concetto di “grafo” è un’ulteriore astrazione matematico-sociologica che sostituisce ai nodi e ai fili (persone e relazioni sociali) vertici e archi (cioè punti collegati da linee).
  • Il concetto di “fuzzy graph” è una versione modificata del precedente concetto di grafo, per supportare l’idea che il singolo “punto” abbia confini vaghi e sfumati con la “linea” che lo connnette ad altri punti. Come dire che gli archi e i vertici del grafo abbiano una sorta di “condivisione empatica” vaga e fluttuante tra vertice e arco, nodo e filo, persona e relazione umana, fino a supportare l’idea conclusiva che il singolo nodo sia in qualche misura “fuzzy” assimilabile al nodo di altri gruppi sociali, alle loro relazioni, alle relazioni di altri gruppi.

Il concetto di centro o nucleo sociale (individuo) ne viene rivoluzionato, in senso matematico e sociologico, divenendo quasi centro, quasi-punto, o in senso finale “centroide”.

Se, poi, si vuole intendere il processo della relazioni sociali come attività di interpretazione del linguaggio e del comportamento degli altri attori sociali, e se inoltre l’atto sociale è atto semantico e centro del processo di interpretazione, – allora, l’individuo o il gruppo, diventano un “centroide semantico” di questa attività di decodificazione, che suppone a un tempo la condivisione del codice e la sua comprensione empatica “come se l’altro fosse me stesso”, ma in qualche misura (vaga o fuzzy).

Occorre, perciò, sostenere che il concetto chiave dei “fuzzy graph” sociali sarà “l’empatia”, intesa come co-essenza o compartecipazione essenziale di ogni attore sociale all’identità e alle relazioni sociali di altri individui e gruppi.

La parola “empatia” deriva dal greco antico “εμπαθεία” (empatéia, a sua volta composta da en-, “dentro”, e pathos, “sofferenza o sentimento”) e designava il rapporto emozionale di partecipazione che legava l’autore-cantore al suo pubblico (p.e. Omero al suo uditorio arcaico). Un grafo sociale fuzzy suppone, pertanto, che gli individui partecipino all’espressione artistica del gruppo.

Il termine empatia è stato poi usato da Robert Vischer (1847-1933, che usò il termine Einfühlung), studioso di arti figurative e di problematiche estetiche, alla fine dell’Ottocento, per individuare nella riflessione estetica la capacità della fantasia umana di cogliere il valore simbolico della natura e delle arti che la riproducono. Vischer concepì questo termine come capacità di sentir dentro e di con-sentire, ossia di percepire la natura esterna, come interna, appartenente al nostro stesso corpo. Rappresenta quindi la capacità di proiettare i sentimenti da noi agli altri e alle cose, che percepiamo. In conclusione, un grafo sociale fuzzy presuppone che gli individui abbiano un pre-comprensione della natura altrui come se fosse propria, per quanto i gruppi e gli individui attenuino questi setimenti come garanzia della propria distinzione come uomini e come formazioni sociali.

Lo stesso termine verrà sviluppato da Theodor Lipps, per definire l’attitudine al sentirsi in armonia con l’altro, cogliendo in sé una somiglianza di sentimenti, emozioni e stati d’animo, o una parziale identità e sintonia con gli altri. I fuzzy graph, allora, sottolineano nella natura fuzzy e centroidale dei nodi la natura sfumata dei confini tra l’io e l’altro, tra il dato gruppo sociale e quello “opposto” o persino “avverso”.

E’ da notare con attenzione che il termine “empatia”, anche tradotto in inglese come “empathy”, designa in sociologia e nelle scienze umane un atteggiamento verso gli altri di comprensione dell’altro, escludendo simpatia, antipatia e ogni giudizio morale preconcetti. Come a dire che nei fuzzy graphs della società fuori di noi vi è sempre la possibilità logico-matematica che la simpatia-antipatia o il giudizio morale siano preceduti da un terreno comune di pre-comprensione semantica e interpretativa del linguaggio dell’altro.

Sono da considerare come primo aggregato di studi teorici sull’empatia (come dato di fatto etologico) gli studi pionieristici di Darwin sulle emozioni e sulla comunicazione mimica delle emozioni, o gli studi successivi sui neuroni specchio scoperti da Giacomo Rizzolatti (che sottolineano l’origine anche non intellettuale dell’empatia, facente parte in realtà del corredo genetico della specie). Sono state anche messe a punto delle scale per la misurazione dell’empatia nella relazione professionale della cura medica, come la Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy. Mentre la nozione di empatia è stata anche oggetto di numerose riflessioni da parte di filosofi e intellettuali come Edith Stein, Antoine Chesì, Max Scheler, Sigmund Freud o Carl Rogers. Il tutto per asserire che i fuzzy graphs sociali hanno una controparte ed un fondamento teorico nella biologia, nella medicina, come anche nelle espressioni teoriche più alte della filosofia, in modo che sarebbe il caso di definire “trasversale”.

Tracce teoriche di una “plausibilità” dei precedenti concetti di centroide semantico, fuzzy graph ed empatia possono essere trovati nelle fonti più disparate. Si pensi, per concludere, alla nota “Lettera Semiseria di Grisostomo al Suo Figliolo” dello scrittore romantico Giovanni Berchet, che ci ricorda come non tutti possano scolpire o dipingere, ma le corde interne di ciascuno di noi possano essere toccate dall’espressione dell’arte e vibrare per una sorta di co-essenza e condivisione degli animi con l’animo del poeta, dello scultore o del letterato.

 

AUTORI DEL BLOG

Lo STUDIO MISURACA, AVVOCATI & FISCALISTI, autore del blog, si dedica ai propri clienti in modo etico e professionale e, inoltre, rispondendo prontamente ai loro quesiti o alle loro richieste di patrocinio. Per i nostri clienti, noi agiamo come consulenti, consiglieri e agevolatori. Ci sentiamo impegnati, nel contempo, ad assicurare un servizio eccellente, preciso e professionalmente adeguato.

Visita il nostro sito web, per conoscere gli autori:

http://www.smaf-legal.com

Fuzzy Logic: quantifying truth

FUZZY MEASURES OF TRUTH

About the notion of quantifying truth, if useful to measure an intermediate truth “x/100%” (and something that can be true “2x/100%” and “2+1/100%”, and…”nx/100%”….).

The numerical truth-value in fuzzy logic (a many-valued logic) is the measure of a co-essence or of an undetermined mixture of a value (false, 0) with its opposite (true, 1). It is a complex score of a proposition.
This co-essence is named fuzziness, and it is measured as co-distance of a certain mixed-score, called FIT (the Fuzzy Information unit), from two opposite BIT (1 and 0). A FIT 0.3 is a truth value implying the co-essence of the score 0.3 of trueness with 0.7 of falsehood.
The fuzziness is a sort of numerical evaluation of BITS, namely of those couple (or n-ple) of basic numbers 1 and 0 of Boolean logic (where BITS imply the classical value “true” and “false” of ordinary classical logic).

Fuzziness is a vagueness or indetermination beetwen 1 and 0, which is measured.

Now, the fuzziness, as co-distance of a FIT from two opposite bits can be also displayed as the internal part of a “Boolean Hyper-cube”.
The Boolean hypercube is the three-dimensional version (improperly called “hypercube”, because it is expandable to a multidimensional one) of the normal Boolean square (which contains the table of Aristotelian truth-value, normally opposite each other, as the vertexes 01, 00, 11, 10). Imagine a square with 4 vertexes (01, 00, 11, 10), they are BITS and are all opposite.

Now imagine that a Boolean cube will have the triples 000, 001, 011, etc. as opposite vertexes (if you are familiar with the magic square of opposite and contrary predicates in Aristotle, you can have a picture of Boolean square).

You can now conjecture the Boolean Hypercube with vertexes 0000, 0001, 0011, 0111, ecc.

What does it mean to say that something is .5 true? This is a point not located on of the vertex of the hypercube, but at an internal point of the volume of the Hypercube, at a “certain distance” from more than one vertexes.
There is no statistical or predictive value of trueness, here, but the evaluation of trueness somehow “static” (there is no projection towards the future as in the case of probabilistic predictions.).

A truth-value of .3576 will be “statically”, but “vaguely” and “in a certain, undetermined measure”, lower than .9999.
Those values re-introduce through the expression “in a certain measure” semantics into formal logic. Just because FITS are, if you want, a Tarskian numerical evaluation of other numbers (the BITS).
Those measures are dimensions of meaning and context.

Finally, the same degree of fuzziness of a FIT can be measured (a sort of metalinguistic semantic of semantic), as the degree of vagueness of a set.
The points near to the vertexes or equal to them (.9999 or 1) are less fuzzy than those in the core of the Hypercube: for example .5666, which is fuzzy more than .9999.
The core of the hypercube (0.5) is completely fuzzy (vague, indetermined).

For an introduction to Boolean Hypercube see:
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Representing-Fuzzy-Sets-in-the-Hypercube-Part-II%3A-Limberg-Seising/22126c6260e9774c447a253a02c98d31b099c966

 

METAPHORS AND THEIR FUZZY LOGIC MODEL

The metaphors are part of quotidian language and I don’t think that fuzzy logic can be a generalization of all MVL logics, maybe there is some paraconsistent language more general than a MVL logic (I suspect it would be something very similar to our quotidian language).

Anyway, the use of numerical values does not restrict the application of fuzzy logic to dimensions of semantics and context which can be straightforwardly quantified, such as temperature, distance, and height, – just because fuzzy logic was expressly introduced, since 1965, to re-connect words (and its metaphorical use) to numbers.
I attach here for you a precious source, the first article of Lofti Zadeh originating all the western math on this important philosophical tool, which all consequences in favor of induction, of solution of strange dichotomies (like i.e. mind/body) are not completely developed. See:https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82810078.pdf

We surely know the common sense about “out of sight, out of mind”. It recalls us the first movement of science, outside the limits of our closest experience (the experience of what we have under our noses, literally). It is the same appeal of rhetoric to a local audience to spread the wings of our fantasy toward a wider world, which will be described, rather than from cosmological maps (as in science), from metaphors (an in literature and in the tribunals).
What is a metaphor? We take the experience of single things in front of our nose and give it a new meaning, “allusive” and conjectural of things more distant from our normal experience (far away in space, in time or distant from our sensibility of Westerners, perhaps of men if we refer to sensibility of animals or extra-terrestrials). More banally, these distant things are often, simply a map of dispersed tokens, so that every general term (a universal term or a concept) is both a metaphor and a theory.

The internal dialectic of a single metaphor between examples and universals (or distant things) is analogy. The analogy is paraconsistent, because it relates, in a way possible or dispositional, what is present and true to what is universally possible and likely. And its aim is to persuade us (inside the field of rhetoric), about reality of what is distant, or make us learn a theory, about a distant universe (inside the field of science), in both cases through that conjecture that is the metaphor.

The relationship between the actual current of the example and the verisimilar of the universal (plus all the intermediate rhetorical figures between example and metaphor) is a dispositional and fuzzy relationship. Analogy is often (not always) fuzzy. Not always, because we have i.e. the proportion (a:b=b:c) as another form of analogy or the Tomistic analogy of Creatures to God (the transcendent term is infinitely not-quasi similar).

Here an explanation of fuzzy nature of analogy and of metaphors, especially inside literature, law, rhetoric and science:
– The use of numerical values does not restrict the application of fuzzy logic to dimensions of semantics and context which can be straightforwardly quantified, such as temperature, distance, and height., – just because fuzzy logic was expressly introduced, since 1965, to re-connect words (and its metaphorical use) to numbers.
– A set of numbers can be evaluated by FITS, but every single FIT is a word (a general term, a universal, a concept, a theory, etc.). For example, a set of different body statures can be evaluated by an Arbitrary Membership Curve (AMC) called “tall”: on the abscissa of a Cartesian graph we have the set of statures, on the ordinates in the same Cartesian plane we have the fuzzy evaluation of membership from 0 to 1.

Now, for example who is 1.54 meters tall is, according to such AMC, .2 tall and, at the same time, .8 short (there is a fuzzy borderline between the two neighboring words & AMC “tall” and “short”).
– The adverb “very” and “a few” can modify the inclination and the base (with respect to the abscissas of the Cartesian plane) of these two fuzzy-neighboring AMC-words “tall” and “short”. The AMC very “tall” will have a stricter base on abscissas and a strong inclination (who is 1.80 meters tall, will be .5 “very tall” and .5 “short”, while he could be .8 tall and .2 short).

Every adjective, verb, new connected proposition to those AMC-words will vary the sense, the meaning and the “proximity” of the description of such statures, enabling us to depict a real man, present in front of our eyes. The complex linguistic statements like “he is humorous man, very tall, coming from San Francisco and allergic to strawberries” is a combination of many vague FITS-word-metaphors-AMC, and the focus and the intersection of such various words and the related AMC will help us, applying all the correct properties (AMC), to visualize such man in front of our mental eyes.
– The different fuzzy FITS, related to the various AMCs which in complex way, describe such man “here and now” (absolutely not “out of sight, out of mind”) can be summed and crossed (as a well ordered group or system of fuzzy sets). So that you calculate, for instance, if the expression “he is humorous man, very tall, coming from San Francisco and allergic to strawberries” is true to a specifiable degree.

Surely we are merely scratching the surface of semantics, but if from such man, who is an organism, you want to infer something about “a community is like an organism”, which is a metaphor starting from this man “here and now”, – you can do it.
– The metaphor will be the procedure of taking the linguistic descriptions of many men (the systems of many fuzzy sets) on a hypothetical abscissa and evaluating it with the AMC “community”, stating which men more or less represent a community, then adding many other adjective, verb and new connected propositions, then conjecturing the analogy of such community with an organism.

The conjectured analogy will be a logic relation of fuzzy possibility, which has surely a certain fuzzy AMCP (Arbitrary Membership Curve of Possibility): for example, such metaphor will be vaguely .2 “possibly” true and .8 possibly false.
– “Possibly” is an adverb which modify the range (inclination and base) of the resultant general (alethic) curve of the entire metaphor.What I have outlined here is called in the scientific literature “computing with words” or “soft computing”.
See this original article:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f26c/be40db22c9b99fe95d368c3aff94beaef488.pdf

Network Analysis of Economy

Introduction

A simple example of network analysis of impact over economy structure of fiscal political provisions.

Many can agree that in the context of European fiscal crisis today’s rise in VAT may be a necessary evil. Moreover, we can disagree that indirect taxes such as VAT are less harmful.

According to S. Strogatz theory of social networks VAT should menace the weak ties (which are the cement of economical society) between economical operators/agents preventing mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place.

Also economical hubs could be menaced. For example, Italian government raised VAT to 21%. Here the problem: why not considering the theory of social network of Strogatz as mathematical reason against this provision?

The theory forecasts that an attack (fiscal in this case) against the hubs (enterprises and businessman) of a social network (economy network) can make the network collapse.

A second example of network analysis can come from FAO politics against poverty.

If we try to define type of wealth or poverty, the issue is: are they referred to material sources and goods or to intangible ones?

We agree only partially. Poverty regards entire person, so both consciousness, body, social condition, culture, food availability, safety, wellness, sanity.

Our conjecture is that a new perspective (network analysis) for FAO should be fighting against groups of political and economical concentration (hubs), into developing nations, which prevent population from epidemical diffusion of wealth, information, education and sanitary assistance.

These hubs are actual Governmental or local administrators into developing nations of Western society aids.

Network analysis could demonstrates that economical systems too much aristocratic (the corrupted central-African governments are such hubs collecting western aids) inevitably crash. Richs become richer, and poor poorer.

While a more chaotic (but not excessively chaotic) distribution of aids could bypass the hubs, and enrich populations.

This is an appropriate model of logic and math capable to enable a scientific conjecture abut deep structure of social sciences and of humanities.

Why?

Because humans and societies are, also, networks.

Social science and small worlds theory: a new math for humanities?

Graphs and networks, hubs and epidemical diffusion of poverty. Could FAO challenge poverty and unequal distribution of prosperity?

Think to what would happen if Bakunin and other socialists had guessed to possibility of math of social networks! See this quick introductions:

http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/Six-Degrees-of-Separation-or-Small-World

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_network

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics_of_social_networking

A proposal: Two political models of individual interaction inside economical networks

We heard that Warren Buffett recommended to “know when quitting an investment”, this seems humility applied to economic individual operators, a formula for poverty relief and a caution against speculation.

It seems opposite to S. Ambrose (c. 340 – 4 April 397, archbishop of Milan) rule of sacrifice in favour of the poor, which seems humility applied to economic “collective” operators. The saint wrote « The land was created as a good for all, for wealthy and poor: why, you rich, have exclusive pretension over the land? […] You [rich] does not give the yours to the poor [when you make charities], but you give back each to his own; namely, the property is common, and it was released in common use, while you only have the use of it» (Naboth, 1,2; 12, 53).

Calling B1 the first rule and A2, the second, let say that if we consider these rules as dramatically opposite, then the prevalence of B1 humility type would give raise to wild capitalism, the prevalence of A2 humility type to communism, – while the cooperation between the two rules would entail a sort of “strange” cooperation between capitalism and workforce (anything similar to “Rerum Novarum” Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor as sketched by encyclical issues of Pope Leo XIII on May 15, 1891).

Recently reading any essays of George Soros about the logic of Boom-bust of economic bubbles, we couldn’t avoid to recognise in this kind of Strange collaboration of capital and workforce the same “borderline area between order and disorder” of a economic bubble in the phase of his development, when it is far from the equilibrium, is growing incorporating false perceptions and influences over the fundaments of the market.

Two enemies (capital and labour) in a reciprocal attempt to be humble?

Whoever can imagine what could come from such socio-political strange cooperation?

A response to global crisis?

A coordination between order and disorder?

A disastrous bust of actual capitalistic views, which gave rise to global crisis?

An explanation about Self-sacrifice, as model of interaction inside economical networks

Sacrifice, as humility and generosity, implies a certain just degree of solitude and self-denigration or passivity. This is clearly a sufferance (which is a sort of evil), but deserves respect considering the greater outcome of, without immediately advancing this humble man’s fortune, advancing both the same humble and his society peace and goodness, which outcome will be coming from a reciprocal help (with reciprocal just disadvantages).

Hume’s rejection of humility as social factor was just an empirical impression (a sentiment or a Hume habitude), arbitrary and a mistake as whatever empiricism, which believes to habitudes.

Effectively, definition of humility seems reinforce the idea of paradox into it, when pointing out that realism of humble own self does not give raise to overestimation of the same self in interpersonal behaviour. This seems a strange kind of realistic sacrifice, very similar to George Soros minding structure of his realistic adaptation to crisis and disasters of Boom-bust of economic bubbles: the humble prevents a bust, and sacrifice himself best before the booming bubble of his ego explodes at the contact with reality.

Not only economic success, but also cultural, political and religious hope can be improved by this kind of humility.

In our opinion, the position of antireligious view, which sees religion (and his natural concept of humility) as a tool of power, which tries to incorporate religion into politics, is fruit of a clearly known north European tradition (initially Dutch, then British and finally American, via your WASP tradition).

It was the Peace of Westfalia in 1648 to stabilize this tradition, after Thirty Years of religious war, started because sovereigns wanted to decide religion views of their subjects.

The Westfalia treaty, paradoxically (this deserve a specific consideration) stated and consolidated the “same” confusing and apparently peaceful principle “cuius regio eius religio” (each single power of each crown can decide religion of their subjects), which principle was the same confusion which pumped up the booming bubble of the war…the same false perception for which in this chat it seems that nobody knows that humility is “religion”, over, before and after any kind of politics or economic success.

Fuzzy Theory of Truth

 

What is a problem for me, maybe for all of us, is how propositions of science become scientific and accepted, given that data and facts are so different, as a genre, from a scientific proposition, so that is such a kind of problem how any facts become relevant for science and how pre-scientific theories become science.

So I propose that a variant-theory of truth, a fuzzy version, could be a possible reply to such problem. Please, read the following short outline.

Suppose a variant to Tarski semantic where a Tarski meta-language shows syntactically “equal to truth” the formal (syntactical) correspondence between an object-language “of facts” and a theoretical language “on facts”. This logical scheme for every empirical control (useful both for dialectic-argumentative refutation and for physical refutation), transforms a semantic correspondence (or the “spiritual” concept of truth) into an unsuspected syntactical comparison of symbols, which could be applied also to scientific theories and to their competition testing.

The correspondence will be, in the variant, a different syntax, that of a vague similarity (fuzzy similarity or fuzzy entropy) between (i) syntagms of variables and terms (symbols of propositions) of facts and (ii) syntagms of variables/terms/proposition of theories incorporated in two compared languages: this is a variant of Popper construction of Tarski semantic theory of truth, because Popper (and Tarski) comparison was a syntax of discrete and percentile comparison, something like a compared measure of percentage of empirical content of object-language and logical content of theory-language (in example: (a) “the snow is white” is partially true if, after an appropriate measure of “percentage of empirical content”, happens of necessity that (b) “the snow is white, but full of stings of grey humus”), while the comparison, in the fuzzy scheme, could be a measure of vague similarity between symbolized facts and theories.

In a simplified scheme, Tarski original scheme is

[50 % T] →L(a) = E (b)

which means: The logical content of (a) is correspondent at 50% (percentage) to empirical content of (b), which is to say that (a) is True at 50%. This syntax implies, directly, the reciprocal refutation [- 50% T] → L(a) = E (b) … Namely, (a) is absolutely false in 50% measure (a non vague measure)!

In the variant scheme the refutation is a little bit complex, but explains better some very common situations of everyday life, like political competitions, religious fights and sport match, and is, maybe, more adequate (even if is not more precise) to empirical contents:

[60% T] (G 20% AND W100 %) → L (a) ≈ E (b).

It means: The fact that the snow is white and full of grey stings is “vaguely” correspondent (similar or “vaguely similar”, see the symbol “ ≈ ”) to a theoretical proposition where the snow is vaguely and truly grey at 20% (if the grey is 20% sufficiently similar to white) and “absolutely” (digitally) white at 100% (independently if the snow is effectively a fact of snow covered by several stings of grey humus, given that we simply suppose the schematic theory that “the snow is white”), so that the proposition (a) is globally and “vaguely” correspondent ( “ ≈ ”) at 60% to empirical content of (b), which is to say that (a) is “vaguely” or “analogically” true at 60%, given that a rough calculation of “vague” similarity grade within grey and white colours could be [ G 20% + W 100% / 2 = 60% ]. NOTE: don’t worry for my arbitrary way of calculating pondered similarity vague grade: is arbitrary this choice to calculate fuzzy entropy and can be improved by mathematicians more expert than me.

Guess following examples of two opposite parties and imagine to shall measure the grade of their opposition.

Let’s say that atheist and theists are opposite in grade of 100% (like for example the concept of existent and inexistent).

Then consider the case of two football teams of the same city (like MILAN and INTER in Italy): they will be opposite in a lower measure: let’s say in a grade comprised between 80% and 60% each other.

Take, then, the example of two different partisan group of same Italian Communist party: they should be contrary (in a political sense) in a grade comprised between 20% and 30%.

Imagine, finally, Mr. Popper, the well-known philosopher, as doubting of his epistemology: Will differ from him in a lower measure?

These examples show, in my opinion, the simpler theory about fuzzy entropy, which concept replies to the dilemmatic philosophical query (dramatically producing great confusion since the times of Hegel): how much two opposite things are similar? Can opposites be similar?

Fuzzy entropy illustrates very clearly a logical theory answering to the problematic inquiry about the evanescent reality of similarity, best called as analogy, within different or opposite objects (no matter if they are tokens, arguments, minds).

Further, the original Tarski-Popper scheme is a logical theory of truth, which does not explain how both logical propositions and empirical propositions of facts penetrate into the meta-language of Tarski semantic.

This is the problem of the sources of knowledge, which Popper solved denying validity to induction and to privileged sources (as induction, verification, evidence, math, religion and other “authorities”), focusing his epistemology on the main relevance of empirical and logical control of theories. Popper would say that fact and theories are simply conjectures to be tested.

The fuzzy scheme of logical theory of truth has these extra benefits (further to the main result of more adequate schematization of empirical control of truth as correspondence):

1. It rehabilitates “induction”, given that a great collection of tokens can, in fuzzy logic, justify, in a logical sense, the abstraction of an inductive general law, which becomes the set of “propositions on fact” of a pre-scientific theory or the group of the analytical enunciations of particular facts (both incorporated into the “semantic” of empirical controls of variant-Tarski-meta-language). Here the explanation: there is a fuzzy theorem, about “vague similarity” (a general fuzzy entropy scheme of opposition grade) between the PART and the WHOLE, which says that “the PART vaguely contains the WHOLE, in certain measure (the measure of the part)” [P.V.C.W.]. This theorem applied to a great collection of tokens justifies the induction of pre-scientific general propositions (i.e. physical laws to be tested) and the analytical induction of general data from huge collections of particular data;

2. The fuzzy scheme of logical theory of truth and the theorem P.V.C.W. also explains how facts and proposition are creatively found and included into Tarski-Popper empirical controls (into their meta-linguistic semantics): similarity between facts and theories (between math and brute facts) allows the theoretician to discover new propositions (it is the art of scientific discovery, construed as such a kind of art of Topics), discovering and correcting propositions in the light of facts, and viceversa, in a continue internal feedback (dialectic, rhetoric and not simply based on laboratories testing).

2. The theorem P.V.C.W. and the concept of fuzzy entropy rehabilitate topics, dialectics and rhetorics as instruments of invention and comparison of facts and theories. Popper himself said that also non-empirical (or even metaphysical) arguments can control internal consistency of theories and eventual contradictions, which arguments should be the aware or not aware background of non empirical theories. Here the explanation: the mentioned theorem, about “vague similarity” between the PART and the WHOLE, suggests that science is a “PARTial” linguistic praxis of the WHOLE of entire human linguistic praxis, which includes also Religion, History, Economy, Art, and so on…Overall, finding new propositions on facts and new general analysis of particular data is not simply based on induction or on fallible Popper conjectures (of theories and facts based on previous innate knowledge), but also on an argumentative feedback, which is based on primary analogy between facts and theories.

3. Finally, the fuzzy scheme of logical theory of truth offers a wider range of empirical controls of truth of theories, given that this scheme of semantic allows type of “empirical refutation” different from “absolute contradiction” of Aristotelian Principle of non Contradiction (P.N.C.). While P.N.C. (with its companions: Principle of Identity and Principle of Tertium Non Datur) allows to make a choice between two incompatible theories, when one of these presents an internal or external inconsistency (contradiction with its premises or with is empirical conclusions)…what about when the theories are similar at any percentage? And when the internal or external contradiction is not 100%? When opposition to facts or to premises is not 100%?…Well, the refutation should be at any percentage!

4. The fuzzy scheme of logical theory of truth explains how people can understand each other, using a natural language (maybe also an artificial one like math or formalized logic), because if the propositions of a talker were not “partially similar” to counter-arguments of interlocutor (and partially different) there would be not that certain halo of ambiguity, where lies the basic possibility and basic originality of discussions. While using terms and propositions completely incompatibles would not prevent us from the deadlock of an absolute refutation (when any terms are 100% opposite). This happens, I think, also in definitions of symbols of new fields of math (I am not referring to very standardized matters like the derivatives calculus), where many mathematicians use variants symbolization and, anyway, they can talk reciprocally, each other.

I would call number 4) benefit as the language vagueness which appears to be the fundamental source of Philosophy as infinite theorization of new logical/empirical controls.

Holistic Theorems

A short introduction: the problem of contingency and the Platonic conjecture of goodness as intelligible immortality

People may believe in contingency and set their moral compasses according to what they presume to be or be not God’s standards, and statistical research may suggests that inferences about beliefs in God or in contingency may instead point people further in whatever direction they are already facing. Ok, why not? I cannot persuade anybody to be faithful or not in God nor that objectivity of morality is in the goodness of being. Neither I can say that things are good (they just are) nor I can give evidences about the eventual real link between things, good and ethics objectives or compasses….The world doesn’t give explanation or moral explanation about itself. This implies no universal meaning against despair and emptiness. I cannot do anything: this is right. Let the things be…they will reveal that all is historical or contingent (things, compasses, inferences about God’s standard, morality, any link between things and good, etc.)…the main frame of space-time (the background of such contingency) will appear contingent as like as energy and matter or the fields of four fundamental forces. So what? How much is big and long lasting the entire universe of space-time, the total mass of matter, the entire wind of mortal spirits, all the moral acts, all of all? To what we will compare such big whole?…As Plato in the Dialogue titled “Parmenides” said: To nothing else than the same whole! This paradox OPENS the being to goodness…Please, consider the great number of paradoxes linked to “a whole universe to be compared to itself”. It will be young as it is young, big as it is big…and, thus, without any clear dimension, quantity, quality, etc. Plato concluded that the being cannot be sensible, but good and intelligible as so called “First Idea of Good” (Plato), and Parmenides that the being is unique, indivisible and without real contingent mortal human beings around…!, which opinions are false and apparent. Jaspers followed the same suggestion…

The problem of goodness as a relative concept: a different conjecture about “openness to goodness”

I disagree with the difference between “in the goodness of being” and “being for others’ goodness”. This is not a difference in that particular “being” which is the “love” of mankind, the “faith” and the “hope”, where it is particularly evident that “being good for others” is the same “heart of goodness of being”. This love of heart is what sustains, as the intelligible ideas of Plato (justly, he said that the main idea of “hyperuranium” is the idea of “Good”), the “whole universe compared to itself”, as described in the Plato’s Dialogue titled “Parmenides”. Namely, if the entire universe of subjects, of intentions, of 3rd Popper world, of matter, of space-time, and of energy should be compared to itself (precisely, to nothing else that the same whole!), then this self-referential whole would be without any clear dimension, quantity, quality, etc. This paradox requests that “it” shall be “open” to “who”, subtracting “it” to ambiguity of being both near “nothing” and near to “infinite something”. The whole “it” shall be completed by “who” is “good” for giving “permanence” and some “stable existence” to such ambiguous “it”. Plato concluded that the “natural” being cannot be neither “completely” real or existent nor sensible, but there should be some hyperuranium which is good and intelligible like the so called “First Idea of Good” (Plato), Parmenides said that the being is unique, indivisible and without real contingent mortal human beings around…!, which opinions are false and apparent (Jaspers followed the same suggestion)…In my opinion, science of natural facts (including psychology, neurosciences, etc.) is good, even studying “it” and discovering beauty of natural order inside the heart of “it”, but empirical or fallible Popper’s science should also consider self-referential whole as suggesting the incompleteness of reality and its openness to the invisible strength of “heart”, which is a “who” enlightening “it”.

A consequence: goodness as ethical criterion

I saw an interesting defence of violence in favour of democracy in K.R. Popper, which could be generalized to any violent defence of any moral value. The theory implies necessity as in the case of immediate facing with a choice to save or not your child from a killer, or democracy from violent tyrannies. The necessity cuts off any difference between ethics and meta-ethics! Simply, you have no time to decide or discuss.

Maybe, there is no universal law during such events. No choice during such state of necessity.

But, if the humans were contingent subjects as they appears, the entire human history would be only an event, including a certain amounts of irrelevant moments where the violence is not a choice simply because this would be just a rare moments of peace, when alive humans are capable (during the peace) to make decisions and discuss on and of levels and meta-levels of ethics.

Well, history in a philosophical sense, is a rare event, singular and due to humans and to existence of the Earth! But, out of philosophy, history could be the absolute memory of historical events when absolute moral beliefs of absolute hearts of men decided to defend a child from death and a people from tyranny, which fact is not holding a belief really strongly, it is just a really, really, strongly act of Love, which is an alive and kicking justice. The statistical absence of good conducts is not a proof in favour of mortal hyper-free human subjects.

Another consequence of holistic theorems: independence of good as the miracle of being

Mr. Dawkins said that if no sort of order which could be defined a miracle, due to its independence from the environment, can be there, then evolution is a real proof against possibility of project and instruction of a God’s project on nature. Why don’t figure the independence of the whole unity of every possible universe as the miracle, which could reasonably be the miracle? (G. Leibniz).

Morality and holism

The problematic essence of Holism as openness of a self-referential world to goodness introduces the discussion about morality. I agree that morality is inter-subjective, as the very origins of the words reveal it: morality > morals > mores > mos (Latin for ‘custom’, as for the Greek word ethics: > ethos).

Morality is a praxis of deeper and deeper pacific interaction between humans or other social subjects, where the moral value or the ethics principle is the whole good relation. The holism shall be taken as the thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Here is a correspondingly vague initial statement of non-separation of morality as a super-system, partially and paradoxically independent from the parts (psychology, language, nation, history, evolution, physiology, etc). If the state of the whole is not constituted by states of its parts, then holism is a methodological thesis, by means of which we could discuss morality of alien networks….namely of networks of aliens (every social subject different from humans).

A logical sketch of holistic theorems

We should try to use in next conjectures also (but verbal arguments are welcomed) Zermelo symbols and syntax in order to discuss consequences, on validity of “induction” (or invalidity), of different logical sets theories on analogy/similarity of sets.

The theme is just what I am trying to focus: something like a set which is, “and not is”, a subset of itself; this is the paradox of Russell (solved by him with theory of hierarchical types and metatypes of sets). Well, I think that this self-reference is not solved by Russell (and others), and the “barber’s paradox” involves some similarity, with itself, of this self-referencing set. This self-similarity is an holistic openness of the set.

This is my topic: similarity (even self-similarity) and its consequences on induction (procedure which takes a certain or high number of “similar” cases and develops universal or generic descriptions). This is an important field for common sense and science (and math), because Russell’s Paradox is both a linguistic and math problem (foundation of math: sets are the logical/linguistic foundation of numbers)…and Russell proposal of types is a “multiplication of categories”, which does not seem to be different from a “regressus ad infinitum”.

A theological consequence: infinity and God

This logical sketch of the infinitum is maybe a personal footnote to lesson of the Fathers of Catholic Church: We have no common definition of God, probably because God thinks of our minds in a plural way (and inside his wisdom, which is Love, our minds exist), and they are plural, so that our minds, being a plural reflex or image of God, obviously have a plural point of view (of faith and of love) about unique mystery of creator’s Love, who creates us from nothing (in nothing else than his wisdom and Love). At the same time, we think of a God, whose Love’s measure, number and weight is infinite (see S. Augustin, De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos, Chapter 22 and ss), so that our finite view of a infinite nature of God’s Love shall be a disperse observation of single (among infinite) properties. If and when I could completely accept the good and even the sufferance (coming from plurality of all things) as a benevolent and mysterious gift of Providence, peace will reign in me, in my friends, my brothers and finally, in the universe.

Worship, pray, faith and mercy are unity of spirits. These qualities are, at the same time, properties, which refers to the same love of God and of humans, where any kind of love is infinity, gratuity, eternity, and purity. A common quality of these properties seems to be a vague unity of a plurality, and, at the same time, out of space-time boundaries, meanwhile completing our fragmentary existences inside space-time.

The same Christian fathers found interesting the concept of Plato about nature non sensible of the being called “First Idea of Good” (Plato), and I personally felt very instructive Parmenides and, particularly, Melissus of Samos about Incorporeal nature of Being.

In my opinion, a valid argument in favour of the holistic concept of being as incorporeal: It comes from Melissus of Samos (five centuries BC, fragment 5 of the presocratic) and from an eventual suggestion coming modern physics.

If entire conceivable nature is an unlimited but finite whole (it is suggested also by hyperbolic geometry of relativity general, which encourages such point of view), Melissus argued that this unlimited One has following remarks:

1.The One has no parts, thus no thickness.

2.Therefore, the One is incorporeal.

This argument is even consistent with a previous (not discussed there) Melissus’ claim that the One is extended and full, because a body extended as you want, but also with no limits, – is not a body.

Namely, thickness is simply the measure of the distance between a body’s limits. Since the One is unlimited, it cannot have thickness, then…

This argument could be still valid for the hyperspace of four-dimension universe of relativity. Ergo: the being is not simply corporeal, notwithstanding that on smaller scale (where we live), we relate one single limited body to other limited bodies, so that we have local dimensions, numbers, measure and weight.

Being could be spiritual?

The absolute reveal its paradox (corporeal and incorporeal), its absolute incompleteness. God shall reveal himself, the whole needs help.

I reply as follows: semantic of an absolute whole regards, directly, its ontology (semantic is usually a comparison of facts and propositions). In my suggestion a particular propositional view of Melissus was compared to facts of Physics, namely to hyperspace of general relativity.

Anyway, I agree that there is a logical jump in deducting from contradictory nature of absolute whole, at the same time corporeal and incorporeal, and from its incompleteness the demonstration of God existence. My suggestion is that nature does not reveal any “god” existence, it is even demonstrated and demonstrable that nature is not a god. This the point: God is not a priori solution, He has nothing in common with nature, neither you can make an abduction about God a priori and to valid demonstrable arguments about it nor you can say anything about spiritual nature of a incorporeal whole.

We can, anyway, feel that such contingent and inconsistent quality of nature is under suspicion, without any non-natural (spiritual) help, which could make more stable its equivocal ontologic inconsistency and, particularly, its absurd birth from nothing. Also admitting eventual Meinong’s ontology of nothing, such concept forbids to allow a creation from nothing “of the same quantistic jumps laws”.

My faith, due to a different kind of reasons (especially acceptation of witnesses of faith), is that our peace comes from serene acceptation that incarnation of God is such help that blessed and gave the gift of salvation to such inconsistent Whole, which, only because of and after such act of faith, reveals its nature of creature.

Any critical observations

I shall consider any clear observations.

Especially,

1) that an equivocal and inconsistent nature of universe proofs that there is no spirit in action and

2) that nothing is ever created from nothing, so that thermodynamics admits that the universe can well be eternal and eternally expanding and contracting, causing itself, needing no cause.

I also appreciated the conclusion that an eternal universe, existing from forever, might not have a cause; and if it has, possibly such cause should not be necessarily spiritual.

3) Finally, there is no empirical evidence nor logical proof for God causation, which you should admit only if this (such evidence or proof) would exist.

Here my reply: 1, 2 are consistent with Hawking theory of an eternal universe placed into imaginary time (for which the big bang is a normal event of an universe existing forever in the imaginary time…the time which flows in every direction of Kasper Wessel plane of complex numbers).

But I made appeal to Melissus, because they (1 and 2, together with conjecture of imaginary time) are subject to refutation by Melissus “demonstratio per absurdum” that an eternal and auto-consistent whole is both locally corporeal and globally incorporeal.

This is the entire logic and experience which, with a matemathical passage to limit, is demonstrated as absurd.

Of course, this is not the necessary logical proof or the empirical argument for God’s existence, it is simply the auto-exhibition by the reason that it has any limitations. This is simply a “preambulum fidei”.

We surely need and have right to a logical proof and empirical evidence for God’s existence. This can be deducted only from incarnation and from the fact that Jesus appeared to some of our fathers. Of course, we have to believe or to Jesus directly or to fathers or to his Church or his witnesses…I am a lawyer: we could start a legal process where possible…I cannot exclude (I am not completely kidding) that some historical evidence, plus other declarations like the synoptics…could be sufficient for a court as proof.

Some abductions, which testify in my opinion ancillary role of reason toward faith.

These suggestions regard invisible things (to which refers S. Paulus). One of invisible gifts of the Wisdom and the Word gave us is our friendship for life (ours and of others, which is Love), our reason (which is the undetectable love of invisible truth and its semantic), our logic (which treat with honour immaterial and imperceptibles entities like sets, predicates, logical ties, syllogisms, propositions, enthymemes and dialectic). How anyone can treat with contempt such gifts for his life (Love, reason/logic, will)? How our freedom can be reduced to anything of material, given that our whole flesh and blood desires to be recognized as a free spirit (at first from our self)?

I was very intrigued with the argument about negative existential propositions (i.e. “God does not exist”). They are impossible over an infinite domain (the absurd emerges as natural consequences of a dicotomic logic based on trinomial of three principles of non contradiction, excluded middle and identity), they could be not even empirically and logically scientific (according to method of fallibilism and to math which is based on said trinomial).

The absurd will be logical and empirical, due to method of controls, even if logically we have the abstract possibility that the Spirit could exist in a infinite domain and “I” as a single self could exist (with a passage to the limit) as non material (invisible) unity beyond every possible element.

We have to agree that the negative existential propositions about God and spirits (and about realities on the same latter level: conscience, reason, logic, truth, self, love and mind) are metaphors of a future inaccessible science. The status of such propositions is logically and empirically metaphysic: namely, they have the status of “possible existence”, subject to future, eventual empirical control and logically based on a quasi-consistent (fuzzy or vague) logic/math: the math of fuzzy frequency or vague probability. Will you agree that existential “possibility” is not black or white, true or false (Kosko, Zadeh, Lukasiewicz, Max Black, and others)?

Well, since ancient Hellenistic Greek philosophy such existential propositions (metaphors or possibilities of absolute entities) were expressly theorized (see theory of Plotin in Enneades about One and Augustin neoplatonic theory about God as unity in De Natura Boni).

So that I conclude that God (spirit, reason, self, mind, love) are somehow subject to definition (in a science of metaphors) as vague logical entities, which truth value cannot fall under the rules of non contradiction and, if they are a possible reality, cannot fall under the laws of a fallibilist control, while they could into a frame of vague logical/mathematical probability referred to those fuzzy sets which are the “whole speech” about absolute as witnessed by the “life” of witnesses of Christ.

The holistic experiment is dialectic (this is in my opinion the empirical control about such realities, very similar to the job of lawyers), and regards the logical contents of others theories.

The experiment is the holistic prolonged observation (intrinsically vague because referred to language speech acts) of others topics (linguistic theorizations), of others argumentation, of others logic of arguments, which ancients (Aristotelian) just defined as parts of “invention”, of dialectic, of topic, of rethoric, etc.

A consequence of holistic theorems at the regard of natural evolution

The intelligent design of Paley, opposed to stochastic evolution of Darwin, seems to be the opposition between what Popper imagined to be the “instruction” against the “trial and error” procedure of evolution.

Hawking seems to use the same argument: “Science predicts that many different kinds of universe will be spontaneously created out of nothing. It is a matter of chance which we are in.” He seems to make reference to chance and to “trial and error”.

Here, in my opinion, a valid counter-argument in favour of the holistic concept of being as incorporeal. This incorporeal nature of being could act as the original “instruction” from the top, which explains unity & order of a universe “a là Paley”.

The counter-argument to Hawking comes from Melissus of Samos (five centuries BC, fragment 5 of the presocratic) and from other suggestions coming modern physics.

If entire conceivable nature is an unlimited but finite whole (it is suggested also by hyperbolic geometry of relativity general, which encourages such point of view), Melissus argued that this unlimited One would have following remarks:

1.The One has no parts, thus no thickness.

2.Therefore, the One is incorporeal.

This argument is even consistent with a previous (not discussed there) Melissus’ claim that the One is extended and full, because a body extended as you want, but also with no limits, – is not a body.

Namely, thickness is simply the measure of the distance between a body’s limits. Since the One is unlimited, it cannot have thickness, then…

This argument could be still valid for the hyperspace of four-dimension universe of relativity. Ergo: the being is not simply corporeal, notwithstanding that on smaller scale (where we live), we relate one single limited body to other limited bodies, so that we have local dimensions, numbers, measure and weight.

Being could be spiritual? I simply understand that Melissus thought that an “absolute” cosmos (universe) reveals its paradox (corporeal and incorporeal), its absolute incompleteness.

So, maybe, God shall reveal himself, because the whole needs help.

We can, therefore, feel that such contingent and inconsistent quality of nature is under suspicion, without any non-natural (spiritual) “instruction”, which could make more stable its equivocal ontologic inconsistency and, particularly, its absurd birth from nothing. Also admitting eventual Meinong’s ontology of nothing, such concept forbids to allow a creation from nothing “of the same quantistic jumps laws”.

The “instruction” of this universe could be the solution to its strange mathematical “inconsistency” (under suspicion, due to Melissus argument). So, we could experiment the serene acceptation that a revelation of God is “such help” that blesses and give salvation to such inconsistent Whole, which, only because-of and after-such act of “instruction” a là Paley, reveals its nature of creature.

In Melissus argument the entire logic and experience, with a mathematical passage to limit, is demonstrated as absurd.

Of course, this is not the necessary logical proof or the empirical argument for God’s existence, it is simply the auto-exhibition by the reason that it has any limitations. This is simply a “preambulum fidei”.

Aesthetics

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A conjecture about nature and objectivity of beauty.

If objective beauty would be a property of others perceptions, the problem of seeing/being beautiful relation would be solved this way: my perception is partly supporting others beauty, others beauties are partly supporting my perception. Somewhere in the process of aesthetic interaction between object and subject shall take place a perfect convergence of two apparently separated realities.

If someone tells to not beat our heads on “Beauty is subjective/Objective”, given that in reality it is both. Not only at different places and occasions but simultaneously too, we could reply with that inquiry: What about difference of opinions and average opinions about beauty?

Neither precise definition for beauty nor discrete average opinions are possible. It/he/she hits your eyes and our eye experiences a vague resonance which vaguely creates and receives beautiful qualia…somewhere, in a fuzzy centre of interaction of vision/hearing/ tasting/smelling, must exist a crisp core of beauty neither objective nor subjective.

 

Beauty 4                          Beauty 5                          Beauty 2            

 

 

Beauty                       Beauty 3