Philosophy & Ontology







Samuel Beckett personages of Waiting for Godot were waiting for revelation of what it is reality or truth or “who is Godot?”. Godot will reveal himself, who will be? When he will come? So we can guess that Ontology is a general problem of such kind: the problem of General Ontology is if “being” is a thing or a subject.


Search Of Truth And General Paradoxes Of Ontology

Let me recall that, these days, I read a very short and concise philosophical work of Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicolas of Cusa), the “Dialogue On the Hidden God” (1444), which is a short conversation between a Pagan and a Christian on the topic of God. In this dialogue you easily can see how the issue of hidden nature of reality is overridden by that of search for truth,… which, according to Cusa, cannot be begun without taking part to the same truth, which truth anticipates us (Cusa said “there is no truth outside truth”). The essay concludes that truth is ontologically and theologically unique, namely it is always unique even in the same very various appearance of empirical true representations of reality, given that a visible object can always be seen in a better way, making our observations recede forever toward a final curtain, where unity of truth shall theoretically reveal itself. And given that nobody can concretely (or operationally) come to this point, Cusa concluded that truth is unique and can be simply be object of worship. It is unutterable, cannot be reached, it simply anticipates or advances us, it allows us using its self-revelation for knowing everything (we are veracious only because we take part to the truth…Aristotle said also something very similar in his book of Metaphysics), and, given that truth is metaphorically similar to sight of colours (which is non coloured), it is neither the same whole being and the whole truth nor the falsehood and the nothingness, neither it is (at the same time) true and false, existent and non-existent. Such reality precedes everything and Christian adore this as the Hidden God.

Fuzziness Of Ontology

This is a conjecturable argument.

Try to paraphrase Quine: what is, at the regard of logical content of propositions, analiticity of analysis, materiality of matter and physicalist nature of physicalism? You will have a dense lattices of premises without justification (someone call it regressus ad infinitum). It seems to me also a sorites without external borders, which let you only the possibility “to not cut exactly” the line (or point) of division between thought, matter and propositions.

I argue, then, that the content of a proposition is not “exactly” reducible neither to thought nor to physical nature. The content shades off, softly, into thought and physical nature. Like a fuzzy set where the proposition, contradictorily, is at the same time, non deterministically, both proposition, thought and physical nature (semantic, logic and ontology).

Analogical Nature Of Ontology Versus Physicalism

A phyicalistic view “and” a physicalistic language seems “both” to not admit analogies. Overall, Tarski’s semantic is a logical model of a correspondence theory between language and the world (according to common construction of epistemologists, first of all Popper), where the material adequacy, within first class language (object-language) about world-facts and meta-language of propositions about the first class language, is the model. What the world is the case is totally irrelevant to Tarski’s model as to any model.

Similarly, about analogies, a to be proposed variant model of semantic tries to describe the approach of metaphoric language to the “world”, and to what we believe to be the trace of a hidden case. So, words such as “mind”, “God”, “soul” refers to traces of these realities inside common world’s facts, formalizing the correspondence of similarity between higher or hidden realities, traces of these in consequential ordinary facts, consequential facts and, finally, metaphoric propositions about facts-traces-hidden realities. There is a bridge linguistic and logical and mathematic (I am referring to fuzzy numbers and fuzzy sets) between a trace of the “deer” and the alive animal, between part and whole (where the trace is partly identical and partly different from and to its whole).

It seems that the risk to enlarge our ontology is a risk only for same classical ontology, not for us, who could believe to a substratum which, more or less metaphorically, underlies everything which is the case.

We shall initiate a new organic point of view of the brain and move up to the metaphoric layers of person, spirit and higher levels. I love this possibility (also the inverse, starting from the spirit, seeing how it propagates his attributes to every infinitesimal neuron or motor neuron).

A Metaphorical Approach To Ontology

We shall combine things, speaking of being in a metaphorical way at first and then using hermeneutics to explain what it might be (we could even develop digital theories, as in physics, after having talked in an analogical way). It could lead to a “koinè” about truth, a common language capable to override the cleavages between science and humanisms, laicism and religion. This should be a chance against devastations of relativism, of solipsism and scepticism. So if our ontology or our epistemology become heretic, why not if we can give a model to metaphysical reasoning?

About defining metaphors very precisely, western thinkers have all instruments: we have secular traditions of Aristotelian topics, Roman and Greek rhetoric, the art of invention (Quintiliano, for example), we have dialectic traditions from Presocratics until Hegel and Marx. Of course, we need math, and this exists: we have Lofti Zadeh theory of fuzzy sets (and fuzzy numbers, FAT theorem, Fuzzy maps, expert systems and neural networks), overall we have the concept of “fuzzy entropy” (which is a measure of how much a metaphor, which is a systems of fuzzy sets, is vague, more or less, numerically).

This fuzzy set based approach to ontology can seem to be too much scientific.

Practically, this would entails, as Heidegger, continuously told, the objection that “science is not a very well grounded knowledge” (it would be only a local, regional, secondary, derived, non-authentically historical sapience), while his tale of being as “Ereignis” would be the perennial authentic historical tale about pure being!

From my side, I am actually skeptical about “Ereignis”, because H. spoke about it as it would be the very shape of “being” (see his conferences of 1941, entitled “Fundamental concepts”). I disagree not for the status of untenable conjecture of this perennial theory, but only because pure being is seen as simple “time”.

I explain: the “event” of Ereignis is the gratuitous event of “Being” (sein) forever showing itself inside existent entities (things and “dasein”) and, at the same time, forever hiding itself inside these.

This way the pure being is an abstracted picture of what is normally and usually the well known “time”.

In fact, the “Ereignis” is the same event of an abstracted appearance of history and/or time, because it is the same appearance and disappearance of entities, “which we normally recognize as time”.

Finally, H’s thought, this way, is a genetic fallacy: old hamburgers are good because they are old! Being is a pure time, because it shows and hide itself inside temporal entities.

Effectively, this temporal approach of H. defends, ecologically, the being and nature from pollution: given that Being-time takes care of us, we shall “take care of it” (“μελέτα τὸ πᾶν”, H. cited the maxim of Periander).

This is an approach both near and far from Catholic inflection: Catholics defend environment and community, because being is philosophically a mystery, which ….cannot be reduced to time.

Phenomenology And Ontology

Given that I am a realist, and I am contrary to verbal excess of Phenomenology definitions (terms and definitions are not so important as controls of refutations over philosophical theories), I agree that existence is a challenge to every common theory (maybe existence is not a theoretical object), but I cannot agree with the fundamental ontology of Heidegger (which must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein, and it is the source of all other ontologies, including the local ontology of psycology), because such theory cannot be made better. I mean that no refutation can challenge this ontology. Every fact will confirm this theory: because this theory intends to exclude any objection.

See why:

This ontology, according to its standard interpretation, means that the human being itself is the ground upon which all other notions of the world and the existence of things stand. This implies that there is no objectivity nor subjectivity, and no cleaving of existence into interior (mental) categories and exterior (physical) categories, since the world and Dasein are only perceived and perceivable through Dasein’s own awareness of its Being.

Well, you clearly understand that no new or absurd or non standard interior or exterior event can refute the conceptual contents of moral consciousness of such Dasein.

There is no possible improvement of this ontology (in a theoretical sense). Overall, it is absurd that the sense of existence could be exhaustively theorized by such Heidegger’s ontology (a moral variant of Husserl scientific phenomenology). Existence is so mysterious…

Theorization of Ontology as a must and a possibility

Where can we find a metaphysical or ontological project that tries to answer the sort of questions we are discussing here?

In previous paragraphs I argued that, ascertaining effects over physical world of hidden levels of reality, i.e. the person seems to be a crisp entity at the borderline of mind and body, which unifies and intermediates the sign and the sense, the semantic and the syntax, the matter and our “invisible” logic.

I said that this kind of metaphysics was, somehow, just proposed by Popper, who said that the person is World 2, intermediating World 1 of brute physical facts and World 3 of cultural objects.

Well, I propose another convenient metaphor, which makes reference to vagueness (as logic).

Think to (and update to today times) the bi-millenary Platonic metaphor (dialogue of Republic) of “divided line”, by means of which Plato divided every possible reality in 4 parts on this divided line: 1) phenomenon of physical object, 2) real physical object, 3) abstract mathematical objects as numbers and lines, 4) ideas as invisible prototypes of numbers and lines.

Plato used the familiar relationship between ordinary objects and their “shadows” or “reflections” in the water, in order to illustrate the relationship of participation between appearances, physical constant object (extension), math and ideas. Math is the shadow (trace, vanishing participation) of ideas. Real object are shadows of math; appearances are trace of real objects.

Well, imagine that the shadow is the metaphor of the invisible trace that makes bridges between polar tangential difference between physical world, which leaves a trace in the person, the person in the culture, the culture in the Spirit of Creator, and vice versa.

Imagine that the logical type of platonic metaphor becomes the vague partial subset, which contains in a certain measure the whole invisibility of higher levels of reality (in a certain measure equal to logical area of subset). You could not define a clear difference between, mind, body, person, etc., embodied in such necessary relationship with other levels.

Logical Status Of Traces: the paradox

I mean, talking about ontological traces of hidden levels of reality, that the law of contradiction does not pertain to them.

This law pertains to a limited field of validity (more limited than we imagine), where its validity is non controversial (i.e. the field of classic logic and math), while ontology, facts and experience are messy and fuzzy!

The classical Augustine argument about non contradictory status of a doubt is partially valid: entities are similar to a doubt, we don’t know its boundaries.

I understand the difficulty to conceive a doubt mixing with non-doubt. The same mixture could be considered non contradictory and the problem be solved!

Thinking to an alternative is really difficult: it is sufficient recalling the dialectic proof of law of non-contradiction supplied by Aristotle (in his “Metaphysics”, book IV). He said (that’s the proof) that if you try to imagine an alternative to the principle, this alternative would be discrete and determined (as the principle, which you were trying to refute).

Aristotle gave three different versions:

1) “It is impossible that the same thing belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.” (1005b19-20)

2) “No one can believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be.” (1005b23-24)

3) “The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are not true simultaneously.” (1011b13-14)

Now, imagine a counter-argument to dialectic proof of Aristotle, which, maybe, will explain how conceiving a doubt mixing with non-doubt.

The following counter-argument will imply a continuous “regressus ad infinitum”, namely a recursive co-applications of dialectic proof to itself, of the following type:

– Try to verify if the principle would be discretely and determinately applicable to each part of the thing or of the belief or of proposition, to which the ontological, psychological and logical version of the principle shall be applied.

– This counter-dialectic proof does not intend to deny validity of the principle, but simply to apply it carefully to each portion of an infinitesimal division of a certain thing, belief, propositions.

– It is a sort of infinite division of the given matter (a sort of logical nano-technology applied to thoughts).

– Now, think to Zeno paradox of Argument from Complete Divisibility. Zeno idea is extreme (and contrary to Cavalieri and Cauchy principles of infinitesimal calculus), but supports the concept that after a infinite division a body (which is, per definition, a “part” of our material universe) either will be infinite or will be nothing. Namely, if after a actual infinite division one of its infinitesimal parts has a magnitude, the sum of this subsets shall be infinite (as said Cantor)…otherwise if infinitesimals have no magnitude (as geometrical points), the sum of subsets will be zero (the body would be nothing).

– The counterexample shows how the infinitesimal part (of a proposition, of a belief or of proposition) is uncertain between “this” and “not-this” and that the infinitesimal research of discreteness desired by the law of non-contradiction (pushed to the limit of a “regressus ad infinitum”) makes emerge imprecision and indeterminism.

Conclusion: These imprecision and indeterminism are not discrete, because the counter-proof shows how this imprecision is produced by the same law of non-contradiction (LNC). This is the sign of the presence of many Multi-valued logics (MVL) near to the field of classic logic (based on LNC), which are an extension of classic logic. I even think that these MVL are important for foundation of classic logic (if you imagine to actuate an inversion of the counter-proof).

This counterexample is, in my opinion, a little bit radical of “Dialetheism” of Graham Priest.

Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called “true contradictions”, or “dialetheia”, and are the ground for so called para-consistent logics.

Anyway, I agree that there are extreme opposites where para-consistent logics cannot be applied, but the examples of brightness Vs darkness, existence Vs non existence regard events which are only temporary mutually exclusive (during their mature appearance).

The experience of crepuscular events like sunrise and sunset, or like birth and death offer a clear counterexample of “non-mature” events, where mutual exclusion is not implied.

I would offer as example of opposites the digital ciphers 1 and 0 or the theological concept of truth as absolute (God opposite to nothingness), but both Godelian paradoxes about math and Negative theology (Apophatic theology) about nature of absolute would disagree with me.

I would ask the reader to find together a valid example of stable (perpetual) mutual exclusive opposites. Otherwise, we should conclude that Law of Non Contradiction regards only mature events.

Ontology And Conclusiveness

In my opinion, philosophy can reach a conclusiveness about experience and about a specific family of “logics”, which would be different from discrete (non contradictory) conclusiveness of math and even of any special fields of science (i.e. relativistic calculus).

My thesis is that philosophical conclusiveness is a certain appearance of truth inside our “logos”, which does not depends from a total exclusion of contradiction (from the “yes or not” of predicates).

Think to a glass of water half empty and half full: this is a vague appearance of truth, which is conclusive and true even if it refers to a vaguely full glass of water.

For example, Sartre concept of existence could be a sort of fuzzy conclusive definition (even if false, in my opinion, when compared to a Christian ontology of person), when applied to mysterious presence of entities of our world.

Existential philosophy, therefore, can enounce some sort of vaguely conclusive theory about the complexity of the person, without being exempt from contradiction.

This way, a subjective perception contains a certain amount of objective physics and logics, according to last argument. Therefore, according to our physical concept of “mobile equilibrium” (well known in Chemic) boundaries are vague between

– the present glass of water

– the next future (which is a certain new present) of its water boiling and being watched evaporating,

– or the eventual future (which is another kind of present) of its vapour turning to liquid, or of its water turning to ice.

If is it so, these apparently atomic “presents” are connected (they are similar or vaguely identical under a sufficiently prolonged look up), there is a relation (liason) between these vague states of matter (given by chemic and by its “mobile equilibrium”).

So a connection between these temporary conclusions is not completely temporary, the “physical-chemical” boundary mixing up the differences is sufficiently stable and independent on the different configuration of the state of water.

Do I arrive at any conclusion? only one – that not everything is in a state of constant movement involving dissolution and recalibration, there is the sufficiently stable “and” vaguely instable appearance of the Universe-At-All (sketched by Physics and Logics), which appears well connected in the form of “a universe” of different states, perceptions and logical propositions, which unity is “chemically” and “logically” accessible from the perspective of local vague boundaries of this glass of water “states”.

The idea that “there is no end to the constant dissolution and reconfiguration of energy the infinite essence which gives existence to All Things”, is the same as to say that there is no scientific deep structure (or communication or constraint between things) coming out from physics laws or from any deep essence of the universe at all. I even believe that this scepticistic idea of universe would be incompatible with “any duration” of life (but this is another matter of observations).

If I would accept that scepticist point of view, in absence of any connection, I should consider the universe as an instable heap of atoms, of atomic states, of atomic perceptions and of atomic logical proposition, without any possible connection (which, instead, I am proposing at the regard of those vague boundaries).

From the idea of vague connections, instead, comes that philosophy can be conclusive at a vague stage. The contrary idea would be a sort of scepticism toward the above mentioned syllogism:

– Logic is not separable from physics, like quotidian perception cannot be separated from physics

– Ergo, for the transitive property: logics are not separable from perceptions.

– Thus, philosophy can be conclusive, when considering this mobile equilibrium of boundaries between logics, physics and quotidian perceptions, even if at the risk of a certain amount of vagueness.

Finally, the advancement of knowledge is not excluded by vague conclusiveness of philosophy: What was vague yesterday, will become less vague tomorrow.

The Phenomenological Objections to Conclusiveness of Vague Ontology

I agree that it is possible a pragmatic ἐποχή about nature of perceptual horizons, about general perceptions and about relationships between logics, physics and senses.

Could this ἐποχή absorb our theorization about Ontology of Vague entities?

Would this pragmatic ἐποχή entail conclusiveness and vagueness of the same ἐποχή?

Yes, but only as first ground of subsequent philosophical observations.

Being only a premise, this ἐποχή is not a proof in favour of agnosticism, because:

  1. The ἐποχή does not deny the very true ground of the doubt, namely the existence of vague entities (subject to ἐποχή).
  2. It is clear that the Metaphysical Part of Philosophy can have very conclusive realizations, like these vague entities:

– Everything has to be somewhere.

– Time only exists in the Present (S. Augustine).

– Life is not the full extent of our existence.

– Observations can not be expressed in less than three constructs, without interfering with the ongoing Changes of what is being observed.

Any Objections Coming From Materialism

The question if materialists admit existence of metaphysical topics like colours, minds and joy (mentioning, i.e., the most unsuspected) is solved by their admission of logical entities, so the Aufgabe of synthetic realities like colours and Spirit is solved: they allow “imagination” of logical entities, so they pursue that these metaphysical levels are necessary.

Overall, science is a set of “hidden levels” like semantics, faiths, hypothesis, symbolization, beliefs, math calculation, algorithms, conjectures: namely, let’s think to beliefs and to faiths implied for example by atoms, which are invisible to the naked eye.

But we know effects, so we conjecture and believe that they are so and so, as we depict them with equations on the dashboard. These conjecture are not only useful, they are somehow true and similar to reality.

If phenomenon (colourless waves) partakes of noumenon (wholistic appearance of “red” colour), shall be true also the inverse: red partakes of colourless waves (namely, colourless nature emerges into meta-level of “redness”)…see Goethe Theory on Colours, who thought that colours are objectively (and subjectively) analogous part of a continuous waves spectrum between darkness and light, which empiricistic theory (and metaphor) was mentioned in his treatise (Zur Farbenlehre).

See online article “Goethean science: bringing chaos to order by looking phenomena right in the “I” (by Tom Mellett, Department of Physics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee): “Goethe realized the scientific experiment itself as the mediator or fulcrum balancing Subject and Object, thus giving equal ontological status to both the subjective and the objective”… “Goethe saw the Aristotelian “immanence” in the object because for him the object included the subject. Therefore, he rejected the object’s Platonic “transcendence,” which demands not only the mutual exclusion of object from subject, but also leaves the subject no choice but to anthropomorphize the object”.

This idea that colours (as example of every a-scientific metaphysical entities) are real would be an extended version of empiricism (contrary to Galilei, Newton, Descartes tradition), because the holistic notion of colour admit a sweet or soft refutations of arguments (and reasoning per analogy) about objective-subjective reality of light.

This is consistent with Bohr’s complementarity theory, with Godel theorems, with Second Wittgenstein (which all reflected on Goethe Theory).

There shall be a strict relation into language, and into perception, between subject and object: Goethe saw this relation in colours as a borderline property, emerging analogically from the extremes of light and darkness, when eye was mixing itself with light and perception. OTOH, Semi-consistent Logics (Wittgenstein linguistic games and Gödelian incompleteness ) see a borderline relation between proposition on facts and proposition on “propositions on facts”, between other linguistic games and perceptions, between perceptions and brute facts. Noumenon filtrates into phenomenon (and vice versa), otherwise knowledge would be impossible or would be a blaspheme monologue.

How does it filtrate? It is a chaotic and non linear response, it is order from disorder as argued by Goethe (Kant, Adorno and Vattimo could simply refuse this possibility, being simply dicotomic illuminists and considering metaphysics beyond logic and experience).

Christians, justly, called it the community of the Church, given that the golden rule is the spirit of man conceived like a cooperative network of atoms of mind (thoughts), of soul (our ethical intentions) and of body (our cells), while the very much huger network of mankind is a very well connected cooperation (a small world somebody says) of the community of all men. It is a trouble for many, but the modest tie, said TS Eliot, that congregates this community (and the ontology of Humanities) is Faith.

(see Max Scheler thesis that persons and their conducts are ontology of ethics).

New Basis for Ontology: Fuzzy Induction

Effectively fuzzy induction is vague, but it can be sufficient in order to give ground to a sufficient ontology (a short explanation: according to a general fuzzy theorem the part contains the whole in a certain measure, then a certain series of tokens vaguely contains the universal whole…fuzzy induction).

Consequences For Theology

This is why (in a mere speculative or rationalist conjecture or vague statement): Induction is a valid process in a variant of probabilistic theory of propensity due to Popper (who unintentionally proposed this kind of theory, even if he was anti-inductivist par-excellence) and this variant is a probabilistic fuzzy induction (valid under indeterminist and vague conditions), so Hume-Locke analysis is wrong. Namely, induction will have a vague and propensional status, but it can be sufficient, in order to give ground to a sufficient ontology (a short explanation: according to a general fuzzy theorem the part contains the whole in a certain measure, then a certain series of tokens vaguely contains the universal whole…fuzzy induction).

So, denying existence and essence of objective religious values (sanctification of Christ and through Christ), or ethical, would be wrong for the same reason.

The theistic thesis is that faith of God toward us is ontologically antecedent to any cosmological theories of humans, and such Faith creates space, minds and logic. This entity is antecedent to any human logic and to any entity. This is my theology, a metaphysical theory (if you like it), supported by the critical arguments of my indeterminism and my realism.

If we use of our faith as a further knowledge core, any conjectural belief about God will neither assign any anthropomorphic identity to him/her/it/them/?/? nor any status of visible or observable entity.

This way I say that existence of universe requires a foundation, because an auto-sufficient universe is vague or incomplete (my godelian logic of auto-reference could say this); my position could be extremer: this universe is founded independently from my logic/semantic/science, given that its nature of brute fact seems to demonstrate to my personal faith that it does not need my logic for continuing to be.

How did we move from Quine to God anyway? God did not abandoned Quine and donated logic (with existence) to him.

This could be a paraphrase of Kantian revolution: not science investigates God, but God create investigators (their internal core, their faith about the problem that there is some investigation to do).

What conditions are we allowed to speak about this God? The same conditions where God allowed us to speak. Otherwise, self reference to attitudes of Mankind is a way to be abandoned to any existential auto-reference which proves inconsistency of Man (maybe it is godelian).

In the paraphrase of Kantian revolution, the notion of God cannot help in an epistemic sense, it would be God to help epistemology, entrusting our internal faith toward consolation of science & technology, which improves our lives, and ensures wellness and survival, without subtracting us to poverty of time, mortality and desperation.

Some general properties of God? Logically we could not need to define God’s properties, because eternity is the description, in my faith beliefs, of a gift without logical reasons, like my existence (which seems a web-node of faith which chains the networks of my corporeal matter, my minds and my unifying self).

No verification tests need the creator of existences, which is demonstrated by these visible existences. Science says that 90% of everything is void: it seems that creator is the Faith, which mysteriously founded from the null the tie which chained, as networks of nothing, all entities.

Critiques To Heidegger Ontology

By this way, I consider that Heidegger ontology (his thesis that this human existence as da-sein can be an access to mysterious nature of Being) is partially saved by recent discovery of subsets theorem of fuzzy logic, applied to existence.

If the myriads of existences are part of the being, let’s see this interesting conclusion of the fuzzy theorem “the Part contains the Whole” (which is somehow opposite to the classic theorem “the whole contains the part”).

If the “part, as sub-set of the whole, contains in a certain measure (equal to the part) the set of the whole, like the whole was a sub-set of the part”- then this single existent is equal to the being in a certain measure, and contains and reveals some logical aspects of the Being (the whole).

The conclusion is that being is polysemic, given that it has those myriads of aspects revealed by the quasi infinite number of existents, which da-sein is vaguely similar to being (is in a certain measure the whole Being). It is an understatement saying as Aristotle that being is said-in-many-ways. We should say as Spinoza that the Being (God for Spinoza) has infinite properties.

The difference is that now we know which logical theorem explains why Heidegger and Spinoza were partially right.

The conclusion about semantic of existence is that it cannot be simply materialistic. If, for example, the minds and the cultures, the spirits, the phantoms, the angels, the saints, the church of deads and alive are real, – then those existences reveal the infinite number of properties of the Whole Being.

Ontology and New Physics

Cosmology is a Semantic of an absolute whole.

Well, it regards, directly, its ontology (semantic is usually a comparison of facts and propositions). In my suggestion a particular propositional view of Melissus can be compared to facts of Physics, namely to hyperspace of general relativity.

Effectively, I agree that there is a logical jump in deducting from contradictory nature of absolute whole, at the same time corporeal and incorporeal, and from its incompleteness the demonstration of God existence. My suggestion is that nature does not reveal any “god” existence, it is even demonstrated and demonstrable that nature is not a god. This the point: God is not a priori solution, He has nothing in common with nature, neither you can make an abduction about God a priori and to valid demonstrable arguments about it nor you can say anything about spiritual nature of a incorporeal whole.

You can, anyway, fell that such contingent and inconsistent quality of nature is under suspicion, without any non-natural (spiritual) help, which could make more stable its equivocal ontologic inconsistency and, particularly, its absurd birth from nothing. Also admitting eventual Meinong’s ontology of nothing, such concept forbids to allow a creation from nothing “of the same quantistic jumps laws”.

My faith, due to a different kind of reasons (especially acceptation of witnesses of faith), it that our peace comes from serene acceptation that incarnation of Christ is such help that blessed and gave the gift of salvation to such inconsistent Whole, which, only because of and after such act of faith, reveals its nature of creature.


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